INTRODUCTION
Scholars have examined the non-disciplinary impact of the professional rules in a variety of areas. Several articles address the impact of the professional rules on aspects of the substantive criminal law. 11 In the civil area, abundant scholarship focuses on the use of the rules of professional conduct in two areas: legal malpractice 12 and disqualification. (2007) . In legal malpractice cases, the majority view is that a rule violation itself is not a basis for malpractice liability, but the rules may be considered in determining whether a lawyer has breached his standard of care. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2)(c) at 375 (2000) (allowing rule violations to be considered in determining whether a lawyer has breached his standard of care). A "small minority of courts" reject the use of ethics rules in legal malpractice litigation. See Richmond, supra, at 939 (collecting cases). 13 Bruce A. Green commentators have addressed the impact of the professional rules on the law of evidence 14 and in retaliatory discharge cases brought by attorneys. 15 Finally, Professor Alex Long has analyzed the enforceability of provisions in lawyer-client fee agreements that violate the professional rules, focusing in particular on Rule 1.5(a) prohibiting lawyers from charging unreasonable fees, Rule 1.5(d)(1) prohibiting lawyers from charging contingency fees in domestic relations cases, and Rule 1.5(c) requiring all contingency fee agreements to be in writing. 16 The non-disciplinary impact of the professional rules on other areas of the substantive law, however, remains unexplored.
This Article takes up one of those areas: the enforceability of certain agreements (other than lawyer-client fee agreements) that are prohibited by the professional rules. The professional rules bar lawyers from entering into certain specific kinds of agreements -what I refer to as "prohibited agreements" -even though those agreements would, in general, be lawful if two non-lawyers engaged in the same transactions:
• Rule 1.5(e) prohibits lawyers from splitting fees with other lawyers except under limited circumstances.
17
• Rule 5.4(a) prohibits lawyers from splitting fees with nonlawyers.
18
• Rule 1.8(a) prohibits lawyers from entering into a business transaction with a client except under limited circumstances.
19
• Rule 1.8(c) prohibits lawyers from soliciting gifts from clients I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. 1990) ("In such instances, we are not constrained to read the rules literally or effectuate the intent of the drafters, but look to the rules as guidelines to be applied with due regard for the broad range of interests at stake."). See also S & S Hotel Ventures v. 777 S.H. Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1987) (because disqualification decision "involves the interests of clients and others" in addition to professional ethics, "the Code provisions cannot be applied as if they were controlling statutory or decisional law.").
14 See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 1315 ("In the end, courts sometimes reject the codes' pronouncements on evidence law, sometimes defer to them (usually through adoption of parallel common law), and sometimes agree with them but do not treat them as legal gospel. Does that make the codes law, quasi-law, law within their own sphere, or simply the distillation of ideas?"). 15 Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys, 79 U. COLO. L. REV., 1043 (2008) . 16 Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements That Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REV., 287 (2009) . 17 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2011). 18 Id. R. 5.4(a). 19 Id. R. 1.8(a).
except under limited circumstances.
20
• Rule 1.8(g) prohibits lawyers from entering into aggregate settlements unless they comply with strict criteria.
21
• Rule 1.8(h) prohibits lawyers from prospectively settling a malpractice case except under limited circumstances.
22
• Rule 1.8(i) prohibits lawyers from acquiring a proprietary interest in a client's cause of action except for a lien to secure the lawyer's fee or a contingent fee. 23 If lawyers enter into these prohibited agreements, they are, of course subject to discipline, but this Article addresses a different issue: if a lawyer enters into a prohibited agreement, is the agreement nevertheless enforceable as a matter of substantive contract law? Specifically, do the professional rules constitute public policy such that an agreement made in violation of the rules is unenforceable under the public policy exception to the enforceability of contracts?
This issue has not been addressed since the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were first adopted thirty years ago to replace the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 24 While the Model Rules were being drafted, Professor Charles Wolfram wrote an influential article arguing that the professional rules in general should play a greater role in the substantive law, describing them as "a largely unexploited resource." 25 Professor 20 Id. R. 1.8(c). 21 Id. R. 1.8(g). 22 Id. R. 1.8(h). 23 Id. R. 1.8(i). The rules prohibit several other specific agreements, see id. R. 1.8(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from negotiating an agreement for the media rights to a case), and id. R. 1.8(e) (prohibiting a lawyer from providing financial assistance to clients except under limited circumstances), but courts have not had occasion to analyze the enforceability of agreements made in violation of these rules. 24 Although Professor Long examined the enforceability of certain professional rules concerning lawyer-client fee agreements, this Article's focus is different in two ways. First, it discusses a variety different professional rules than Professor Long did. Second, Professor Long's focus was on whether courts permit attorneys "at least some type of recovery" (on the contract, in quantum meruit, or for restitution) even if an attorney-client agreement violates the ethics rules. Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements That Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REV., 287, 301 (2009)..Professor Long's fascinating conclusion was that courts "permit[] lawyers to recover for the reasonable value of their services when traditional contract law would prohibit such recovery." Id. at 334. This Article, by contrast, focuses on whether the professional rules constitute public policy such that contracts entered into in violation of the professional rules are in violation of public policy. 25 Wolfram blamed this on the Code's "very high level of generality in expressing its concepts" and predicted that the new model rules would play a more significant role in the substantive law if the rules were redrafted in a "substantially more specific document."
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This Article assesses Professor Wolfram's 33-year old prediction concerning the rules' impact on the substantive law and concludes that Professor Wolfram was largely correct. The Model Rules are much more specific than their precursor, and the courts have increasingly relied on them as a source of substantive law in deciding the enforceability of the prohibited agreements. That reliance, however, is far from uniform; a substantial minority of courts continues to reject the applicability of the professional rules to substantive contract law. Moreover, in accepting or rejecting the rules of professional conduct as a source of substantive law, courts almost uniformly engage in little discussion or analysis and instead simply decide in a conclusory manner that the professional rules either do or do not constitute public policy without providing any reasons why the courts should or should not rely on the professional rules. 27 This Article serves two primary purposes. First, it illustrates the split among the courts considering the substantive impact of agreements made in violation of the professional rules. Second, in urging more uniform and widespread use of the rules, it provides the theoretical and public policy justifications that are almost completely absent from the courts' consideration of the issue.
Part I of this Article provides the necessary background on the public policy exception to the enforceability of contracts. Part II reviews the split of authority among the courts that have considered whether the professional rules constitute "public policy" for purposes of substantive contract law. Part III argues that the courts should embrace the professional rules as a source of substantive contract law and provides the theoretical and public policy justifications that are missing from the jurisprudence. First, the rules now resemble other legislation and should be treated like other legislation.
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Second and relatedly, courts generally make broad use of statutes in civil litigation. 29 Third, courts have generally found the codes and customs of other professionals to be relevant in civil litigation, and there is no reason to 26 Id. 27 Cf. Long, supra note 16, at 332 (criticizing courts for their failure to "explain their decisions to depart from the standard presumption against recovery when a contract offends public policy" treat lawyer codes differently. 30 Fourth, lawyers -the persons who are most likely to be disadvantaged by the use of the rules in substantive contract disputes -play a dominant role in drafting the rules and therefore should not be heard to complain about their use in civil litigation. 31 Fifth, the rules are underenforced by the bar, and their use in civil litigation can help achieve an acceptable level of attorney compliance. 32 Sixth, the professional rules derive from common law duties and therefore do not impose any added burden on lawyers. 33 Finally, the primary argument advanced by courts that reject the use of the professional rules as substantive law -the language in the Preamble to the rules which largely disclaims any influence on or relationship to the substantive law -is weak. 34 The rulemakers drafted the rules to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate lawyer conduct. If conduct is wrong and therefore subjects the lawyer to discipline, it is illogical to say that we should ignore that rule violation in the context of civil litigation.
I. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Although parties may generally "contract as they wish … sometimes … a court will decide that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some overriding interest of society and will refuse to enforce a promise or other term on grounds of public policy."
35 Under this public policy exception, courts will generally not enforce an agreement if "the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms."
36 Under the Restatement, courts are to consider a variety of factors and take a flexible approach. In determining the "interest in enforcement of a term," the courts should consider "the parties' justified expectations, any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term."
37 In "weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term," the Restatement directs courts to consider: 36 Id. The Restatement also provides that an "agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable," but even if the rules constitute "legislation" they do not explicitly say anything about whether the agreement is unenforceable; they simply prohibit the lawyer from engaging in the transactions. 37 Id. § 178(2).
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term. Violation of a rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy… The Rules … are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. 46 Thus, the Restatement of Contracts and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers suggest that the professional rules should be considered "legislation" within the meaning of the Restatement, even though the rule legislative enactments, ordinances and administrative regulations to be treated in the same way for purposes of the civil law. If the ethical rule was intended by the court to create a standard of conduct which protects a particular class of persons from a particular type of harm, then the standard should be relevant to the standard of care expected of lawyers regulated by the state.").
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (2000) (emphasis added). 44 Id. § 47 cmt. i. 45 Id. § 36. 46 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 20 (2011). Having made this lengthy disclaimer, the last sentence of the paragraph does concede that "Nevertheless, since the Rules establish standards of conduct a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of a breach of the applicable standard of conduct. " Id. drafters largely reject any role for them in the substantive law.
The primary focus of this Article is on the first issue: for the reasons discussed in Part III, courts should put the professional rules on equal footing with statutes and treat them as "public policy" for purposes of contract law. A detailed discussion of the second issue -determining whether and under what circumstances agreements made in violation of the rules of professional conduct should nevertheless be enforced under the Restatement's "flexible" approach and/or whether attorneys should be able to recover in quantum meruit or restitution even if the agreement is held unenforceable -is beyond the scope of this Article.
II. SURVEY OF LAW
Having described the traditional contract rules concerning agreements that offend public policy, this Part examines the split of authority over whether the lawyer professional rules constitute public policy. On this issue, the courts are sharply divided. 47 This Part canvasses that split in two different ways. First, it uses Pennsylvania as a case study of the confusion among courts -even those courts in the same state -about the appropriate impact of the professional rules on the substantive law. 48 Second, Subsection B canvasses the split of authority on the different prohibited agreements contained in the rules of professional conduct.
A. Pennsylvania: A Case Study
The Pennsylvania courts have taken wildly different views on the impact that the professional rules should have on the substantive law and provide an illustration of the confusion engendered by the issue. This subpart describes those views chronologically. ) ("Agreements between attorneys and clients concerning the client-lawyer relationship generally are enforceable, provided the agreements satisfy both the general requirements for contracts and the specific requirements of professional ethics."), with 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 241 (2011) ("It has been held that the rules of professional conduct governing attorneys are not statements of public policy that may be employed to void contracts."). 48 I chose Pennsylvania as a case study because in surveying the case law discussing the impact of the professional rules on the substantive law, Pennsylvania law stood out as particularly muddled.
In two cases from the 1970s involving disqualification motions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court weighed in definitively: "In Pennsylvania, the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility have the force of statutory rules of conduct for attorneys." 49 In both cases, the Court went on to determine that the attorneys had violated the professional rules and therefore should be disqualified.
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Just six years later, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court backpedaled dramatically from this position and stated, albeit in a different context, that the "Code of Professional Conduct … does not have the force of substantive law." 51 In that case, a lawyer had drawn a deathbed will for his client naming himself and his brother as beneficiaries in clear violation of the professional rules. 52 The court recognized that the lawyer's conduct violated the rules but declined to invalidate the will on that basis: "We have not … heretofore used such misconduct as a basis for altering the rules of law, including evidentiary rules, presumptions and burdens of proof, which would otherwise apply to a case. We decline to do so here."
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered no justification for its reasoning other than a citation to the Preamble to the code then in force which contained the typical disclaimer "'nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such duty.'" 54 In distinguishing its earlier decisions concerning disqualification, the Court said: "[W]hile it may be appropriate under certain circumstances for trial courts to enforce the Code of Professional Responsibility by disqualifying counsel or otherwise restraining his participation or conduct in litigation before them in order to protect the rights of litigants to a fair trial, we are not inclined to extend that enforcement power and allow our trial courts themselves to use the Canons to alter substantive law or to punish attorney misconduct." 55 In a final twist, however, the Court, after going out of its way to disclaim reliance on the professional rules, went on to hold that the will was invalid based on common law doctrines that were, in essence, the same as the professional rule. 56 This prompted a dissenting justice to comment: Five years later, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shifted its position concerning the impact of the rules on the substantive law yet again. In that legal malpractice case, the court fully embraced the professional rules as a basis for establishing the applicable standard of care.
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But just three years later, in the well-known case of Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz, 59 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shifted gears yet again taking a confusing and equivocal view of the rules. In opining about the plaintiff's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, the court observed that "simply because a lawyer's conduct may violate the rules of ethics does not mean that the conduct is actionable, in damages or for injunctive relief."
60 At the same time, however, the court emphasized that the ethics rules are not entirely irrelevant and chastised the lower court for concluding that "the trial judge's reference to violations of the rules of ethics somehow negated or precluded the existence of a breach of legal duty by the Pepper firm to its former client."
61 Rather, the Supreme Court said, since the lawyer's fiduciary duties predate and form the basis of the ethics rules, a lawyer's misconduct can violate the ethics rules and form a basis for a lawsuit by a client. 59 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992). 60 Id. at 1284. 61 Id. (The Superior Court "stood this correct analysis on its head. That court held that the trial judge's reference to violations of the rules of ethics somehow negated or precluded the existence of a breach of legal duty by the Pepper firm to its former client. The court also held that the presumption of misuse of a former client's confidences, developed in the law of disqualification, is inapplicable because the present case involves an injunction. Both of these propositions involve serious confusion in the law governing lawyers.") 62 Id.
Thus, in a series of four decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took no consistent view on the impact of the professional rules on the substantive law. While these cases arose in different contexts, the court failed to articulate any guiding principles for determining the relevance (or irrelevance) of the professional rules outside the disciplinary context. 63 Not surprisingly, the confused pronouncements from the state's highest court have led to decidedly mixed results in lower court cases. One trial court relied directly on the professional rules in concluding that an agreement to split fees that violated the rules of professional conduct was "void and unenforceable on public policy grounds." 64 Similarly, a federal bankruptcy court, interpreting Pennsylvania law, held that the attorney's acquisition of his client's property was actionable because it violated the professional rules. 65 The court noted that: "Violations of disciplinary rules which are consistent with independent substantial law may serve as the basis for substantive legal conclusions" even while acknowledging the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's previous admonition that the "Code of Professional Responsibility does not have the force of establishing independent substantive law." 66 In another case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to enforce a fee-sharing agreement between a lawyer and nonlawyer because it violated Pennsylvania Rule of Conduct 5.4.
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In the two most recent pronouncements from the Pennsylvania appellate courts, however, the Superior Court reiterated the view that the rules do not have the effect of substantive law. In one case, the court refused to set aside a lawyer's action to foreclose on his client's house, despite the client's claim that the mortgage violated Rule 1.8. 68 The court 63 See also Munneke & Davis,supra note 12, at __ (describing the Pennsylvania courts' "uneasiness" with the relevance of the professional rules). 64 
B. Survey by rule
This Part surveys the courts' treatment of agreements entered into in violation of the professional rules. As set forth below, the majority position is that agreements made in violation of the rules are unenforceable, but there is a distinct minority of cases that take the other view. 72 Moreover, there is a great deal of variety in the approaches taken by the courts. (2009) ("Although the majority of courts are likely to hold that a fee agreement that fails to comply with an ethical rule is void as against public policy, a significant minority of courts have demonstrated a reluctance to do so in certain situations."). 73 As but one example, courts sometimes will enforce agreements that violate the Part also describes the rationales that the courts offer for their positions, to the extent that the courts offer any justification at all. Most courts simply say that the professional rules do or do not constitute public policy without providing any explanation. Under Model Rule 1.5(e) and its state counterparts, if lawyers are not in the same firm, they may divide a fee only if the "division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation," and "the client agrees to the arrangement." 75 The comment explains the policy behind these limitations: "Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership." 76 If lawyers enter into an agreement that violates this provision, will the courts nevertheless enforce it? The courts are divided. 77 The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and a significant majority of the courts who have looked at the issue conclude that such agreements are unenforceable. 78 The Restatement provides: "This is professional rules if the noncompliance is minor. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client Section 381(Although "[a]ttorney fee agreements which violate the rules of professional conduct are against public policy and will not be enforced by the courts … fee agreements which are otherwise reasonable will not be ignored because of minor noncompliance with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."). 74 Long, supra note 16, at 332 (criticizing courts for their failure to "explain their decisions to depart from the standard presumption against recovery when a contract offends public policy"). 75 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e)(1) (2011)..Moreover, as with all fees, the total fee must be reasonable. Id. at 1.5(e)(3). 76 Id. at 1.5 cmt. consistent with the view that ethics rules express public policy, such that a contract violating them is unenforceable as against public policy," 79 but the Restatement does not explain why the professional rules should be treated as public policy. Nor do most of the courts that have considered the issue. One justification that a few courts have offered is that "It would be absurd if an attorney were allowed to enforce an unethical fee agreement through court action, even though the attorney potentially is subject to professional discipline for entering into the agreement." courts have insisted on enforcing agreements even though the agreements violate the jurisdiction's professional rules concerning fee splitting or otherwise stated that a violation of the rules is irrelevant to the issue of contract enforcement. 81 In other cases, courts have enforced agreements where the rules violation was not "substantial."
82 Again, these courts rarely offer much explanation for their conclusions, though they sometimes rely on the language of the Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct, 83 which largely disclaims any relationship to or influence on the substantive law. 84 These courts fail to explain, however, why this disclaimer -which was written by lawyers to protect lawyers -is authoritative on the issue. The only other explanation offered by courts is the absurdity of lawyers 83 Freeman v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569, 575-76 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Indiana law). ("As something designed to provide 'guidance,' but not to be a basis for civil liability, our best prediction is that the Indiana Supreme Court would not permit one of its attorneys to invoke Rule 1.5(e) as a shield against living up to a substantively unobjectionable contractual arrangement with an out-of-state lawyer."); Poole, 61 So. seeking "'to avoid on 'ethical' grounds the obligations of an agreement to which they freely assented and [from] which they reaped the benefits. '" 85 Finally, the Maryland courts take a unique, middle-ground approach: agreements made in violation of Rule 1.5(e) may be unenforceable. "We highlight the word "may" for a reason. Although a fee-sharing agreement in violation of Rule 1.5(e) may be held unenforceable, the Rule is not a per se defense, rendering invalid or unenforceable otherwise valid fee-sharing agreements because of rule violations that are merely technical, incidental, or insubstantial or when it would be manifestly unfair and inequitable not to enforce the agreement."
86 Under the Maryland approach, courts should look to a variety of factors in determining how to handle allegations that an agreement is unenforceable because it violated Rule 1.5(e):
When presented with a defense resting on Rule 1.5(e), the court must look to all of the circumstances -whether the rule was, in fact, violated, and if violated (1) the nature of the alleged violation, (2) how the violation came about, (3) the extent to which the parties acted in good faith, (4) whether the lawyer raising the defense is at least equally 85 Ballow Brasted O'Brien & Rusin P.C., 435 F.3d 235, 242-43 (2d Cir. 2006); ABA, ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REFERENCE MANUAL § 41:701 (2012) (These courts are "offended by the notion that a lawyer would try to manipulate the ethics rules to keep a larger cut of the fee. They allow the plaintiff lawyer to use estoppel to prevent the defendant lawyer from invoking the possible ethical invalidity of the fee-splitting contract as a defense to payment."); see also ABA Comm. On Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 870 (1965) ("This matter of ethics should have been recognized and adhered to by the attorneys before they entered into the agreement. When two lawyers have participated in an unethical agreement one of them should not, where no one else is involved, set up the unethical agreement against the other."). Potter, 688 A.2d 894 (Del. 1997) ("As a matter of public policy, this Court will not allow a Delaware lawyer to be rewarded for violating Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Conduct 1.5(e) by using it to avoid a contractual obligation. To hold otherwise would encourage non-compliance with the Rule and create incentives for malfeasance among Delaware lawyers at the expense of unwary out-of-state lawyers."). In a slightly different context, a Florida appellate court rejected an argument by a referring lawyer that he should be able to escape malpractice liability in a suit brought by the client because the lawyers had not obtained the client's written consent to the fee-splitting arrangement in violation of the rules. To hold otherwise, the court said, "would allow attorneys to thwart their responsibility to a client by intentionally disregarding the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar." Noris, 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Watson v. Pietranton, 364 S.E.2d 812, 814 (W. Va. 1987) (We agree with the reasoning of both the ABA Committee and the Shapiro court that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule, alone, will not defeat a contract between lawyers.FN6 A lawyer or law firm which enters into and honors a fee-splitting agreement with another lawyer may not later raise DR2-107 of the West Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility as a bar to enforcement of the agreement."). 86 Post v. Bregman, 707 A.2d 806 (Md. 1998).
culpable as the lawyer against whom the defense is raised and whether the defense is being raised simply to escape an otherwise valid contractual obligation, (5) whether the violation has some particular public importance, such that there is a public interest in not enforcing the agreement, (6) whether the client, in particular, would be harmed by enforcing the agreement, and, in that regard, if the agreement is found to be so violative of the Rule as to be unenforceable, whether all or any part of the disputed amount should be returned to the client on the ground that, to that extent, the fee is unreasonable, and (7) any other relevant considerations. We view a violation of Rule 1.5(e), whether regarded as an external defense or as incorporated into the contract itself as being in the nature of an equitable defense, and principles of equity ought to be applied.
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The Maryland Court of Appeals made clear that a court retains the power to order enforcement of a contract even if it violates the ethical rules: "If a court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, orders an attorney to abide by a contractual obligation that violates the MLRPC, the order is valid and the ethical matter rests among the attorney, the client, and the disciplinary authority." .; Gallagher conclusion. 92 One policy argument that would seem to be relevant is the identity of the parties involved. Unlike agreements made in violation of Rule 1.5(e), which involve two lawyers, agreements made in violation of Rule 5.4(a) involve a lawyer who is subject to the professional rules and a non-lawyer who may not know the rules and is not, in any event, subject to the rules. But most courts who consider this issue conclude that it does not matter that a lawyer may be taking advantage of a non-lawyer. 93 Similarly, these courts are not moved by the fact that if a lawyer enters into an agreement with a non-lawyer and then the non-lawyer cannot enforce the agreement, the lawyer is unjustly enriched. 94 As one court so colorfully ("Although contracts for investigative and paralegal services are ordinarily legal and enforceable, defendant cannot, by fractionalizing the illegal agreement, circumvent the statutory proscription and public policy against agreements of this nature."); 832 S.W.2d at 757 ("Ordinarily, a contract between an attorney and one not an attorney, providing that the latter shall procure the employment of the former by a third person for the prosecution of suits to be commenced in consideration of a fee to be procured or collected therein, is void as against public policy…."). 93 McIntosh, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he doctrine of illegality considers whether the object of the contract is illegal. It does not turn on whether the illegality applies to the party seeking to enforce the agreement."). 94 Infante, 558 A.2d at 1338 ("While we recognize that our decision may unjustly articulated this idea: "It does not matter whose ox is gored. The courts will not enforce an agreement when it is found to be against public policy."
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Other courts, however, insist on enforcing an agreement to split fees between a lawyer and non-lawyer even though the agreement violates the rules of professional conduct. 96 Although these decisions generally lack extensive analysis to support this conclusion, the most common rationale that these courts offer is that the disciplinary rules are for lawyer discipline and not for other purposes. As one court put it: "We decline to treat the disciplinary rules as equivalents of criminal statutes in this context….The disciplinary rules as invoked here govern attorney behavior, not the behavior of all citizens. Though entry into a fee-splitting agreement might subject [the lawyer] to professional discipline, the agreement itself is not invalid solely because it violates his professional duties." 97 Another court reasoned that it would be perverse if an attorney were "permitted to promise a bonus arrangement that violates the fee-sharing rule, and then invoke the Rules as a shield from liability under that arrangement." 98 As at least one court noted, this argument has particular force when a lawyer who is charged with knowledge of the professional rules is trying to take advantage of a nonlawyer who is not. 99 enrich defendant to the extent that he has received the benefit of any investigative and paralegal services performed by plaintiff, the pervasive proscriptions against such agreements require that we not render any assistance to these parties."). 95 o the extent that plaintiff elected to do business with a lawyer, plaintiff thereby exposed herself to the machinations of the rules that govern that profession. Because MRPC 5.4(a) prevents defendant from making payments in accord with an agreement to share a fee with a nonlawyer, that rule prevents plaintiff from collecting that share by way of an enforcement action."). Some courts that refuse to enforce the agreement still permit the nonlawyer to recover on unjust enrichment or quantum meruit grounds. We the People" Paralegal Services LLC v. Watley, 766 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting recovery on unjust enrichment grounds even though agreement is "illegal and null"). 97 Atkins, 865 S.W.2d at 537. 98 Patterson, 980 So.2d at 1234; Shimrak, 912 P. 2d at 822 ("[I]t would not be fair under the circumstances of this case to adopt a double standard and allow attorneys to receive free investigative services simply because of their claim that the other party to the contract was in pari delicto" with them."). 99 Danzig, 904 P.2d at 312 (agreement is enforceable by nonlawyer because nonlawyer is not subject to the rules of professional conduct and therefore not "in pari delicto" with the lawyer).
Rule 1.8(a): Business transactions with clients
Concerned about the possibility of lawyer "overreaching," 100 Model Rule 1.8(a) and its state equivalents provide that a lawyer can only "enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership … interest adverse to a client" if three conditions are met: (1) the terms of the transaction are "fair and reasonable" and "fully disclosed in writing"; (2) "the client is advised in writing of the desirability" of seeking independent legal advice; and (3) the client gives written informed consent.
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The issues that arise concerning business transactions with clients are a little different than those that stem from fee disputes. While some of the business transaction cases deal with the enforceability of agreements that violate the professional rule, in other cases, clients are trying to assert a separate cause of action (e.g. for breach of fiduciary duty) against their attorneys for entering into a contract in violation of the rules. Again, the courts' treatment of the effect of a violation of the professional rule on the substantive law is decidedly mixed. Some courts have said that a contract entered in violation of 1.8(a) is unenforceable because it violates public policy, 102 though they have offered little else in the way of explanation.
By contrast, several courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Again, some courts reach this conclusion by relying on the language in the Preamble. 104 Using similar reasoning, another court simply declared that the professional rules "are not substantive law" and therefore held that allegations that the attorney breached them would at "most … establish … a basis for a disciplinary proceeding against him, not a substantive basis to invalidate the mortgage." 105 Several other courts drew a contrast between an illegal fee splitting agreement, which the courts said are never enforceable, with business transactions between lawyers and clients which are not absolutely forbidden under the rules. 106 These courts said such transactions may be void, though refused to void the particular transactions at issue for reasons that are not entirely apparent. 107 Another court reached the similar conclusion that business transactions made in violation of the professional rules are voidable but not void. 108 Finally, most courts refuse to allow clients to assert an independent claim based on a violation of Rule 1.8(a). 109 Generally speaking, courts reach this conclusion by citing to the Preamble to the rules which, as noted earlier, provides that the rules do not have application outside of the disciplinary process. 110 Although these clients may sue for breach of common law duties, these courts hold that the rules of professional conduct do not create an independent cause of action. The obvious concern with such gifts is "overreaching" by the lawyer. 112 There are few reported cases concerning the enforceability of such gifts, but there is a split of authority in those cases, and, again, the courts offer little in the way of explanation for their positions. In one Louisiana case, 113 the lawyer prepared a will in which he would receive his client's cash, bank accounts and 85% of her real estate. The will also said that if any of the bequests made to the attorney were prohibited, the bequest would go to his wife. The Louisiana Court of Appeals voided the gifts reasoning that "The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct (formerly the Code of Professional Responsibility) have the force and effect of substantive law" but provided no further explanation. 114 A Texas court came to the same conclusion. 115 By contrast, as noted earlier, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the applicability of the professional rules in a similar case. 116 In that case, the lawyer drafted a deathbed will for his client naming himself and his brother as beneficiaries. Citing to the Preamble, the court declined to look at the professional rules: "The Code of Professional Conduct, to which members of appellee's profession were held at the time he did this 'unconscionable' act does not have the force of substantive law…. Thus, appellee's failure to live up to that Code, standing alone, would not invalidate this will." 117 5. Rule 1.8(g): Aggregate settlements Rule 1.8(g) and its state equivalents provide that a "lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the client … unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client."
118 This rule ensures that each client gets to have the "final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement" as required by Rule 1.2(a).
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There are few reported cases discussing the enforceability of agreements made in violation of this rule, but the majority of those have voided settlement agreements that do not comply with it. Again, these courts simply characterize the professional rules as "public policy" with little further explanation. The Texas Supreme Court, for example, rejected an aggregate settlement because it did not comply with the professional rules, which it described as the "public policy" of this state, and the court therefore held that "the release and settlement of the Quinteros' cause of action [was] void and unenforceable." 120 The court did not explain why professional rules should be employed in private law cases but instead emphasized the importance of the policy underlying this rule. "The policy expressed in [the rule] is clearly to ensure that people such as the Quinteros do not give up their rights except with full knowledge of the other settlements involved." 121 A federal district court in Colorado 122 reached a similar conclusion, holding that the representation agreement, which enabled counsel to enter into a settlement that would bind all claims with the consent of only the plaintiffs' steering committee, violated the aggregate settlement rule and was therefore unenforceable: "any provision of an 117 The court offered no explanation for why the rules constitute public policy. 124 By contrast, several courts have upheld settlements even though those settlements were made in violation of the rule. 125 None of these courts offered any explanation for treating the rules as something less than "law," but instead decided to uphold the settlements in light of what the courts considered to be relatively minor violations of the rule. Rule 1.8(h)(1) and its state equivalents prohibit a lawyer from making "an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement." 127 According to the comments, such agreements "are likely to undermine [the lawyer's] competent and diligent representation" of the client and are difficult for clients to evaluate. 128 Two separate substantive law issues arise with respect to this provision. First, is an agreement that contains such a provision enforceable, and, second, can a client state a separate cause of action against an attorney for violating this rule? Again, the few courts that have considered the substantive impact of this professional rule are divided.
Concerning enforceability, the Restatement unequivocally provides that "[a]n agreement prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice is unenforceable." 129 The comment explains that "[s]uch an agreement is against public policy because it tends to undermine competent and diligent legal representation." 130 Some courts that have looked at this issue have taken a similar view. For example, the New York Appellate Division held that a clause in the retention agreement could not serve as defense to a malpractice action because the clause violated the professional rules: "While a violation of a disciplinary rule 'does not, in itself, generate a cause of action … a release obtained in violation of a disciplinary rule should not serve to shield a lawyer from liability before the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the document are fully examined."
131 But a few courts have refused to treat the rule as having any impact on the substantive law. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that a provision in the retainer agreement requiring arbitration of any claims arising out of the attorney-client relationship was enforceable even though the client had not had the opportunity to retain independent counsel to review this provision in violation of Michigan Rule 1.8(h).
132 "[T]hough failure to comply with the requirements of MRPC 1.8(h) may provide a basis for invoking the disciplinary process, such failure does not give rise to a cause of action for enforcement of the rule or for damages caused by failure to comply with the rule."
133 Similarly, a Texas appellate court found that a violation of 1.8(h)(1) "does not necessarily establish a cause of action, nor does it void an otherwise valid contract executed outside of the attorney-client relationship." 134 The Texas court relied primarily on the preamble to the rules in reaching this conclusion. Under Rule 1.8(i) and its state counterparts, a lawyers "shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client" with two exceptions: a lien to secure the lawyer's fee and a contingent fee arrangement. 136 The comment explains that the rule is designed to "avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the representation, it will be difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires."
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There are few reported cases that consider the enforceability of an agreement made in violation of the rule, but in both such cases, the courts held that the agreements were enforceable despite the rule violation. In one Texas case, the court relied on the preamble to the Texas rules to find the rules violations irrelevant: "the Garcias do not direct us to any cases holding agreements violating DR 5-103 and DR 5-104 were unenforceable and void as against public policy, and we have found none."
138 A Connecticut court used the same reasoning: "Although we do not condone violations of the ethical rules governing attorneys, after reviewing Noble and the preamble of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and in light of the factual findings of the court, we hold that the violation of rule 1.8(j) does not bar enforcement of the note." 139 III. THE COURTS SHOULD MAKE GREATER USE OF THE RULES.
As the preceding survey reveals, the courts are divided on the effect that the professional rules have on substantive contract law, and, whatever side they take on the issue, their analysis is largely conclusory. This Part envisions a greater role for the rules in substantive contract law. Subpart A discusses the proper doctrinal role for the rules, and Subpart B sets forth the theoretical and public policy justifications in favor of greater use on the rules as a source of substantive law.
A. The professional rules' proper doctrinal role
As set forth in Part II, courts typically resolve the question of the rules' impact by simply declaring that the rules do or do not constitute public policy in the state. As noted above in Part I, however, the proper analysis is much more involved. Courts take a "flexible" approach in determining whether a contract that violates a legislative pronouncement should nevertheless be enforced. For an agreement to be unenforceable on public policy grounds, the interest in enforcing the agreement must be "clearly outweighed" by a public policy against enforcement. Moreover, even if a contract is declared unenforceable on public policy grounds, courts sometimes provide recovery under a theory of quantum meruit or 137 Id. at R. restitution. 140 In other words, declaring that the professional rules constitute public policy is just the first step, and the court then needs to decide whether or not to enforce an agreement made in violation of that public policy. In determining the weight to give to the public policy, the Restatement directs courts to consider: "(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term." 141 This is a highly fact specific inquiry.
The primary focus of this article is to advance this first step of the analysis and urge courts to recognize that the professional rules are a strong expression of public policy and should be treated as the equivalent of legislation. A comprehensive analysis of the myriad issues involved in undertaking the second part of the analysis -whether an agreement that violates public policy should nevertheless be enforced -is beyond the scope of this Article. There are simply too many different factual scenarios. That being said, I offer two thoughts on the issue that courts should consider in undertaking this second part of the analysis. First, courts should consider the identity of the party who is seeking to declare an agreement unenforceable because it violates a professional rule. Courts should keep in mind that the rules were drafted by lawyers and only lawyers are subject to them. Thus, the courts should be more willing to declare an agreement unenforceable because of a professional rules violation when a non-lawyer is advancing that argument than when a lawyer is making it. Several courts have noted the absurdity of lawyers seeking "'to avoid on 'ethical' grounds the obligations of an agreement to which they freely assented and [from] which they reaped the benefits.'" . See also Potter v. Peirce, 688 A.2d 894 (Del. Supr. 1997) ("As a matter of public policy, this Court will not allow a Delaware lawyer to be rewarded for violating Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Conduct 1.5(e) by using it to avoid a contractual obligation. To hold otherwise would encourage non-compliance with the Rule and create incentives for malfeasance among Delaware lawyers at the expense of unwary out-of-state lawyers."); ABA, ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REFERENCE MANUAL § 41:701 (2012) (These courts are "offended by the notion that a lawyer would try to manipulate the ethics rules to keep a larger cut of the fee. They allow the plaintiff lawyer to use estoppel to prevent the defendant lawyer from invoking the possible ethical Second, this second step of the analysis offers courts the opportunity to weigh the importance of the public policy at issue. While all of the rules should be considered public policy for the reasons discussed below, the rules (including the rules discussed in this Article) serve different public policy interests, and the courts should consider the importance of those public policy interests in deciding whether to enforce an agreement that violates the professional rules. For example, most would agree that avoiding undue influence is a particularly important public policy and, therefore, courts should in most cases enforce that policy by holding that agreements entered into in violation of rules that protect against undue influence, such as Rule 1.8(a), are unenforceable.
B. Theoretical and public policy justifications for greater use of the rules

The "legalization" of the professional rules
Numerous scholars have described the "legalization" of the rules of professional conduct. 143 imperatives -"shall" and "shall not" -just like statutes. Third, the rules are quite specific, particularly the provisions concerning the prohibited agreements at issue here.
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Courts' use of statutes
Courts make broad use of statutes in civil litigation. 160 This use extends beyond just criminal statutes. 161 "Common modern illustrations of this expansive treatment are cases in which statutory or administrative regulations of businesses or other groups or of activities such as operating a motor vehicle are employed to create or define rights of action for recovery of damages on behalf of persons for whose benefit the regulations were formulated." 162 Such reliance "rests on the view that the fundamental policy choices reflected in the statute should also be relied upon by courts in assessing the alleged offender's liability for damages or other civil relief." 163 If one governmental body "has branded certain conduct as inappropriate, consistency demands that other organs of government pay heed when making judgments about the same conduct." 164 In this case, the same body (the judiciary) has enacted the rules of professional conduct and should enforce those rules in litigation. As noted in Part II, the policy choice reflected in the rules is largely client protection. In enacting the rules, the courts have chosen to protect clients and they should make the same choice in deciding civil cases. It makes little sense for the courts to say that lawyers will face discipline if they enter into a certain agreement but then turn around and enforce such agreements without regard to the fact that the agreement violates the professional rules.
Professors Rotunda and Dzienkowski make a similar point in the context of disqualification motions where "courts have consistently relied on ethics codes to establish standards for ruling on claimed conflicts of interest." 166 As they point out, such reliance is logical since "[t]he rules of ethics are judicially imposed court rules. It is more than a little inconsistent for a court to promulgate a rule that states that a lawyer cannot represent a particular client because to do so would violate Rule 1.6 (governing confidences and secrets of a former client) and then allow the lawyer to appear before the court in blatant violation of the rule -particularly where the purpose of the Rule is to protect the former client." 
Courts' use of other professionals' codes and customs
Courts have generally found the codes and customs of other professionals to be relevant in civil litigation. 168 For example, courts frequently look to the American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics in considering whether a doctor has violated his standard of care. 169 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that the professional code of engineers was properly admitted into evidence in a suit against unlicensed engineers because "the codes provide some guidance in determining what conduct is appropriate for unlicensed engineers." 170 In another case, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that a violation of the Code of Realtor Ethics is evidence of negligence by a realtor. 171 Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court has said that the rules and standards promulgated by the board of pharmacy "do not necessarily establish the duty of care owed by the pharmacy in this case, [but] they are relevant to the issue and may provide guidance in determining if there is a duty of care under the circumstances." 172 Courts also look to the accountants' code of professional conduct as the relevant standard of care in claims against accountants. 173 Finally, the clear majority view in legal malpractice cases is that while a rule violation itself is not a basis for malpractice liability, the rules may be considered in determining whether a lawyer has breached his standard of care. 174 The courts' reliance on other professional codes, as well as the use of the professional rules in legal malpractice cases, counsels in favor of greater use of the professional rules in contract law cases.
Lawyers write the rules
Another argument in favor of applying the rules beyond the disciplinary process is that lawyers develop and draft the professional rules. As Professor Wolfram argued, "Surely the class of persons who would be disadvantaged in private litigation by imposition of Code duties -lawyerscannot claim that the Code has been drafted without sufficient consideration of its interests. Attorneys, through the organized bar, have played a very dominant role in the development of the Code." 175 Nor would the imposition of lawyers' professional rules as substantive law in civil cases step on the legislature's toes since, under the "inherent powers" doctrine, the legislature (in theory) plays no role in the regulation of the bar. 176 Under this doctrine, courts claim the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law based on constitutional separation-of-powers grounds. 177 In other words, state supreme courts have long taken the sole legislative role when it comes to the legal profession. 178 One potential objection to the use of the rules in private law disputes is that the rules are too biased in favor of lawyers. In other words, it would be unfair to nonlawyers involved in litigation with lawyers to use the biased lawyer rules as the substantive basis for decision, particularly when the general public has not been involved in the drafting of the rules. 179 At least in the case of the prohibited agreements at issue in this article, there would not necessarily be any prejudice to non-lawyers. If an agreement is made in violation of the rule, the court should consider the agreement to be made in violation of public policy, but as discussed earlier, just because the agreement violates public policy does not mean that it is unenforceable. Courts exercise great flexibility and consider a variety of factors in deciding whether to enforce an agreement that violates public policy. 180 In the event that a lawyer seeks to get out of an agreement with a non-lawyer on the ground that the agreement violates public policy, the court could nevertheless decide to hold the lawyer to the agreement because it would be perverse if an attorney, for example, were "permitted to promise a bonus arrangement that violates the fee-sharing rule, and then invoke the Rules as a shield from liability under that arrangement." 
Underenforcement by the Bar
Commentators have long criticized the disciplinary system for failing to adequately police the profession. 182 Bar authorities tend to be understaffed and underfinanced, and they are, of course, dominated by the group that they regulate. 183 Moreover, studies consistently show that judges fail to do their part in reporting lawyer misconduct. 184 These and other factors leave the disciplinary rules woefully underenforced. 185 One recent study concluded that more than 75% of the bar complaints in Texas were dismissed without any investigation.
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If the bar authorities are not enforcing the rules (and the important norms underlying the rules) through the disciplinary process, the courts can fill that gap. The increased use of the rules in civil litigation "may be necessary to achieve an acceptable level of attorney compliance" with the professional rules. 187 Lawyers might be more likely to comply with the rules if they know that there will be economic consequences if they do not. 188 Further, aggrieved parties arguably have a greater incentive than the
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the largely unexplored issue of whether agreements entered into in violation of the professional rules are nevertheless enforceable as a matter of substantive contract law. In addressing this question, the Article accomplished two principal tasks. First, it illustrated the split among the courts considering the substantive impact of agreements made in violation of the professional rules. Courts are sharply divided and have taken a variety of approaches in dealing with this issue, but, whatever their conclusion, their analysis has been lacking.
Second, in urging more uniform and widespread use of the rules in substantive contract disputes, it provided the theoretical and public policy justifications that have been almost completely absent from the case law. First, the rules now resemble other legislation and should be treated like other legislation. Second and relatedly, courts generally make broad use of statutes in civil litigation. Third, courts have generally found the codes and customs of other professionals to be relevant in civil litigation, and there is no reason to treat lawyer codes differently. Fourth, lawyers -the persons who are most likely to be disadvantaged by the use of the rules in substantive contract disputes -play a dominant role in drafting the rules and therefore should not be heard to complain about their use in civil litigation. Fifth, the rules are underenforced by the bar, and their use in civil litigation can help achieve an acceptable level of attorney compliance. Sixth, the professional rules derive from common law duties and therefore do not impose any added burden on lawyers. Finally, the primary argument advanced by courts that reject the use of the professional rules as substantive law -the language in the Preamble to the rules which largely disclaims any influence on or relationship to the substantive law -is weak. The rulemakers drafted the rules to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate lawyer conduct. If conduct is wrong and therefore subjects the lawyer to discipline, it is illogical to say that we should ignore that rule violation in the context of civil litigation.
Although this Article focused on the courts' treatment of certain prohibited agreements, the argument in favor of greater use of the professional rules has broader application. The lawyer professional rules have now matured into "law," and it is time for the courts to treat them as such.
